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SPECULATIVE DYNAMICS AND THE ROLE OF FEEDBACK TRADERS
ABSTRACT
This paper summarizes our earlier research documenting the
characteristic speculative dynamics of many asset markets and
suggests a framework for understanding them. Our model incor-
porates "feedback traders," traders whose demand is based on the
history of past returns rather than the expectation of future
fundamentals. We use this framework to describe ways in which
the characteristic return patterns might be generated, and also
to address the long-standing question of whether profitable














Cambridge, MA 02138The 1987 stock market crash demonstrated more convincingly
than any econometric test ever could that not all movements in
asset prices can be accounted for by news about fundamental
values. The efficient markets hypothesis was probably the right
place for serious research on asset valuation to begin, but it
may be the wrong place for it to end. In this paper, we review
some of our research directed at providing an alternative frame-
work for thinking about fluctuations in speculative prices.
As proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis stress,
repeated analysis of the single time series on U.S. stock returns
is bound to turn up patterns sooner or later. Our research has
therefore sought to determine whether there are regularities that
appear not just in U.S. equity returns, but also in returns in
other countries' stock markets, and in other assets. Given that
risk factors are likely to operate differently in different
markets, finding common patterns across markets suggests the need
for consideration of the speculative process itself.
After summarizing our earlier research documenting the
characteristic speculative dynamics of many asset markets, we go
on to suggest a framework for understanding them. Our model
incorporates "feedback traders," traders whose demand is based on
the history of past returns rather than the expectation of future
fundamentals. We use this framework to describe ways in which
the characteristic return patterns might be generated, and also2
to address the long-standing question of whether profitable
speculation stabilizes asset markets.1
I. Characteristic Speculative Dynamics
Table 1, which is drawn from Cutler, Poterba and Summers
(1990), where the results are described in much greater detail,
provides summary evidence on three empirical regularities in the
markets for stocks, bonds, foreign exchange, and various real
assets. First, excess returns display positive autocorrelation
at relatively short horizons. Both the one—month return autocor—
relation (column 2) and the average of the first twelve monthly
autocorrelations (column )arepositive and statistically
significant. The average one—month serial correlation coeffi-
cient for the thirteen equity markets we consider exceeds .10,
and bond markets exhibit even greater autocorrelation.
Second, there is a weak tendency for returns to be negatively
autocorrelated at durations of several years. The average
autocorrelatjons at 13—24 months (column 4) are negative for
stocks, bonds, and foreign exchange, although the latter finding
is not statistically significant.
Many technical trading systems are designed to take advant-
age of exactly the sort of serial correlation patterns suggested
here. It can be shown, for example, that procedures which
involve using the crossing of two moving averages as a trading
1Our discussion of destabilizing speculation is largely




Autocorrelation Horizon (Months) Within
Asset 1 1—12 13—24 Four Years
Equities (1960—88, .101 .021 —.026 41.20
13 markets) (.026) (.006) (.008) (27.48)
Bonds (1960—88, .238 .064 —.013 —10.21
13 markets) (.041) (.011) (.005) (17.08)
Ex. Rates (1974—88, .067 .033 —.010 31.92
10 markets) (.037) (.012) (.012) (18.43)
Gold (1974—88) .020 .051 .017 133.19
(.075) (.022) (.023) (20.98)
Houses (1970—86, .206 .083
4 cities) (.032) (.033)
Collectibles (1968—88, .365 .011
7 markets) (.160) (.153)
The excess returns on all assets are measured as nominal returns less the
short term interest rate. These returns are monthly for all assets except
houses (quarterly) and collectibles (annual). For all assets except gold,
the standard errors in parentheses correspond to the standard error of the
average autocorrelation across markets. The regression coefficient in the
last column is the result of estimating an equation for 48-month returns
using the logarithm of the ratio of fundamental value to the current asset
price as the explanatory variable. The fundamentals are defined for each
asset in the text. The values in brackets are the probability of observing
regression coefficients at least as positive as the reported value. These p
values are based on Monte Carlo simulations described in detail in Cutler,
Poterba and Summers (1990).3
signal are optimal if autocorrelations are at first positive and
then negative.
Third, in most cases, returns over periods of several years
can be predicted on the basis of crude proxies for the deviation
of asset prices from fundamental value. For each market, we
defined a proxy "fundamental value": a constant multiple of
dividends in the case of stocks, the reciprocal of the short—term
interest rate for bonds, and a constant real exchange rate and
real gold price. The last column reports regression coefficients
from equations relating subsequent forty-eight month excess
returns to the logarithm of the current fundamental—price ratio.
In the markets for equities and gold, and to a lesser extent
foreign exchange, these measures have substantial forecast power
for returns. The result for equities suggests that forty percent
of the deviation between price and our fundamental value measure
is eliminated within forty—eight months. Similar evidence for
house prices is presented by Karl Case and Robert Shiller (1989),
who show that the real cpaital gain on houses can be forecast
using lagged values of the rental—to—price ratio. They also show
that over horizons longer than those in Table 1, the real cpaital
gains on houses exhibit negative serial correlation.
Changing risk factors have thus far been unable to explain
these characteristic patterns of asset returns. For several
reasons, we suspect that theories focusing on the dynamics of
speculation will be more successful. First, the pattern of
correlations is similar in markets where risk might be expected4
to operate very differently, for example the bond and stock
markets. Indeed, in the foreign exchange market, risk affects
both currencies and thus has no predictable effect on exchange
rate levels.
Second, qualitative discussions of major movements in specu-
lative prices, for example Charles Kindleberger (1978) or Elliot
Montrell and Wade Badger (1974), focus on the interaction between
traders who extrapolate past price increases and traders whose
expectations are formed on the basis of fundamentals. We suspect
that such accounts may also explain more recent movements in
asset prices. In the summer of 1987, for example, stock prices
were near record highs relative to dividends or earnings.
Although this could be attributed to investor perceptions that
equities were safer than they had been in the past, a more
plausible account is taht investor demand for equities was fueled
by expected large capital gains from a continuing bull market.
Third, Poterba and Summers (1988) show that for specifica-
tions of the equity risk process which are consistent with
empirical findings on volatility, increases in risk which raise
future required returns should reduce current returns, thus
leading to negative autocorrelation at high frequencies. John
Campbell and Robert Shiller (1989) also show that there is little
evidence that fluctuations in the price—dividend ratio forecast
increases in real interest rates or other measurable aspects of
risk.5
II. Modelling Speculative Dynamics
This section develops a model of asset price dynamics when
investors follow heterogeneous trading strategies. The impor-
tance of investor differences is clear from the substantial
volume in modern securities markets, far more than would be
expected if all investors held market portfolios and traded only
to rebalance or finance consumption outlays. On the New York
Stock Exchange, for example, almost 75 percent of the shares
trade hands each year (New York Stock Exchange (1988)), and it is
estimated that almost $400 billion of foreign currency is traded
each day.
We consider a futures market, where there is a well-defined
fundamental equal to the terminal value but where there are no
dividend payments. We also assume that the asset is in zero net
supply.
We postulate three types of traders. The first group invest
on the basis of rational forecasts of future returns, holding a




whereRt is the ex post return in period t, Et is the expectation
operator using information available as of time t, and p is the
required return on the risky asset. For sufficiently large -y,
this model reduces to the traditional constant required return
model of asset pricing.6
The second class of investors, fundamentals traders, base
expected returns on prices relative to perceived fundamentals.
When prices are high relative to perceived fundamentals, their
demand is low. If the logarithm of the price and (true) fun-
damental value are respectively t and demand is:
(2) S2t = —a(L)ft); <O; cz(l)=l.
Such behavior is implied by investment strategies such as those
based on "dividend discount models." We assume that the logar-
ithm of the fundamental evolves as a random walk: =tl÷
We allow for the possibility that perceived fundamentals reflect
true fundamentals with a lag, i.e., that c(L) does not equal
unity. If some traders have quicker access to information than
others, in any period only some of the traders will know the
current state of fundamentals.
Finally, feedback traders base demand on past returns:
(3) 53t =8(L)(Rt
—
where8(L) is an arbitrary lag polynomial. Positive feedback
trading, buying after price increases, could result from the use
of stop loss orders, from portfolio insurance, from a positive
wealth elasticity of demand for risky assets, or from margin
call—induced selling after periods of low returns. It could also
result from technical analysis models designed to catch incipient
trends. Negative feedback trading, buying after price declines,
could result from "profit taking" as markets rise, or from7
investment rules that target a constant share of wealth in
different assets.
Asset market equilibrium requires:
(4) Sl,t + + ,t 0.
Assuming a constant required return (p) of zero, this yields a
rational expectations difference equation for the asset price:
(5) Et(pt+i — =- -a(L)ft)/-y
—S(L)(pt
—
Solvingthis equation gives the asset price as a function of past
prices, expected future fundamentals, and past fundamentals. The
pricing function also displays the property that fundamental
innovations (€) are ultimately fully reflected in prices.
III. Explaining the Stylized Facts
This model can generate positive serial correlation in
returns in any of three ways. First, if fundamentals traders
learn about true fundamentals with a lag (a(L)l), then fundamen-
tals perceived by these traders will differ from those perceived
(correctly) by the rational traders. With no feedback traders
(6(L)=O), this implies that following positive news, the rational
traders will drive the price above perceived fundamentals of the
fundamentals traders (a(L)ft) but below the true fundamental
The expected capital gain to the rational traders when
news is ultimately incorporated in prices is just enough to
induce them to hold a long position opposite the fundamentals8
traders. As the information is incorporated, the fundamentals
traders will purchase assets held by the rational traders.
Returns will therefore be positively serially correlated for as
many periods as it takes for the information to be incorporated
in demand.
Negative feedback traders (E(L)<0) are a second potential
source of positive autocorrelation. Consider the market without
fundamentals traders (=0) and with one period negative feedback
traders (51<0). Positive returns associated with favorable
shocks to fundamentals reduce asset demand from negative feedback
investors. Rational investors must take offsetting long posi-
tions, so expected returns to these investors must rise. On
average, subsequent returns will therefore be higher, and returns
will be positively serially correlated. The higher returns will
show up as capital gains on the asset so that, as with the
earlier case, the initial price reaction to the news will be
incomplete. Negative feedback trading by central banks "leaning
into the wind" to delay the incorporation of news into exchange
rates has been advanced as a possible explanation for positive
autocorrelation in currency returns.
Finally, positive autocorrelation can result from the pres-
ence of feedback traders who respond to returns in several
previous periods. If excess returns in one period affect feed-
back trader demand in many subsequent periods, feedback traders
will persistently demand long or short positions. Required
returns for rational investors will therefore be above or below9
average for several periods, and this pattern will be reflected
in positively correlated ex—post returns. The precise autocor—
relation properties generated by this market depend both on the
nature of the feedback demand and on the speed with which fun-
damentals traders incorporate news about fundamentals into
demand. Even without fundamentals traders, however, slowly—
adjusting positive feedback traders can induce positive autocor—
relation of returns.
This third scenario, feedback traders with long memories,
can generate negative autocorrelation at longer horizons as well
as short run positive autocorrelation. With enough positive
feedback demand, prices will over—react to fundamental news. In
the long run, however, prices must change by only the amount of
the fundamental shock. This implies that returns must be nega-
tively serially correlated over some horizons.
IV. Can Prof itable Speculation Lead to Instability?
Models with heterogeneous traders can be used to study a
variety of issues concerning the performance of asset markets.
We illustrate this by examining the effects of speculation on
price stability. The traditional view, presented for example by
Milton Friedman (1953), holds that profitable speculation --
buyingwhen prices are low and selling when they are high --will
offset other market shocks and thereby stabilize prices.
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), however, show
that this view nay be incorrect when sone market participants10
engage in feedback trading. They present a stylized model in
which profitable speculation can raise the variance of returns
relative to the variance of shocks to fundamental values.
The franework developed above can be used to illustrate this
point. Table 2 presents the results of numerical solutions of
the autocorrelations, the variance of returns, and the variance
of the fundamental-price deviation for the following special case










AsTable 2 shows, returns exhibit positive first-order autocor-
relation, but are negatively serially correlated at two and three
lags.
For this case, a speculator following a positive—feedback
investment rule over short horizons would earn profits. Table 2
shows that while an increase in this type of speculation (an
increase in 81) reduces the seriall correlation in returns, it
raises their variability. In this example, prices initially
undershoot changes in fundamentals. An increase in the impor-
tance of short horizon feedback trading brings prices closer to
fundamentals, but also increases feedback demand in subsequent
periods. This increases the variance of returns as well as theTable 2: An Example of Destabilizing Speculation
Summary Properties After Increasing
Statistic Base Case -y a
Autocorrelations
Lag 1 .0220 .0196 .0137 .0200
Lag 2 —.0347 —.0324 —.0343 —.0346
Lag 3 —.0405 —.0374 —.0401 —.0405
Variance of 1.106 1.100 1.124 1.110
Returns
Variance of .0092 .0081 .0100 .0094
Price Around
Fundamental
The table shows numerical solutions of the three—equation model in (6)—(8)
The last three columns increase the indicated parameters by .10 (for -)and
.01 (for l and a). The variance of returns and the variance of the devia-
tion between price and fundamental value are scaled by the variance of
fundamental innovations.11
variance of prices around fundamentals. Profitable speculation
is therefore destabilizing.
Table 2 also reports comparative static results for two
•other parameter changes. An increase in y,whichraises the
responsiveness of rational traders to changes in expected re-
turns, moves all autocorrelations toward zero and reduces the
variance of returns and the variance of prices around fundamen-
tals. Raising a1, the speed with which fundamentals traders
incorporate information into prices, also reduces the autocor—
relations but destabilizes prices for reasons similar to those
above.
V. Conclusion
Our analysis of how feedback traders affect asset returns
assumes that investors do not learn from past experience. A more
realistic model would allow trading rules to change in response
to factors such as the recent success of different portfolio
strategies or, as in Robert Barsky and DeLong (1989), new infor-
mation about the stochastic process of dividends or prices. For
example, if investors inferred from the pre—war experience that
stock prices were negatively serially correlated at long hor-
izons, and so rushed to purchase at troughs and to sell at peaks,
they would reduce this serial correlation. Such adaptive trading
rules would generate time—varying properties for asset returns
and nay provide a partial explanation for the finding, emphasized
by Myung Kim, Charles Nelson, and Richard Startz (1989), that the12
negative serial correlation in long—horizon U.S. stock returns is
nore pronounced prior to World War II than in the subsequent
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